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STATEMENT 0F THE CASE

I.

A. Nature 0f the Case

The Defendant-Appellant, John Loewe, entered a conditional plea of guilty
of a Felony Possession 0f a Controlled Substance, methamphetamine; as well

as,

a

to the crimes

Misdemeanor

Driving Under the Inﬂuence, reserving his right t0 appeal the denial of his request t0 suppress

all

evidence and statements obtained by the ofﬁcers in that the ofﬁcers neither had probable cause,

nor reasonable, articulable suspicion t0 stop the vehicle the defendant was driving.

The Course 0f Proceedings and

the Disposition

The Defendant-Appellant was charged by criminal complaint With Count
Possession 0f a Controlled Substance, t0 wit: methamphetamine, and Count

II,

I

— Felony

Driving Under the

Inﬂuence, a Misdemeanor. The Defendant-Appellant ﬁled a suppression motion challenging the
legal right of

Ofﬁcer Vekir Alajbegovic

t0 stop the Defendant—Appellant’s vehicle.

At

the

suppression hearing, Ofﬁcer Vekir Alajbegovic and Ofﬁcer Dennis Clark testiﬁed. After

argument, the District Court submitted a

Motion

to Suppress

0n the

13th

Memorandum

Decision denying Defendant-Appellant’s

day 0f November 2019.

On

the 9th day of

December 2019,

the

Defendant-Appellant entered a conditional plea 0f guilty to both Charges and was sentenced 0n the
24th

day 0f February 2020. Defendant-Appellant timely ﬁled an Appeal.

B. Statement 0f Facts

At

the suppression hearing,
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Ofﬁcer Vekir Alajbegovic testiﬁed

that While

0n duty

for

Jerome City, he was dispatched
“possible

details

DUI”

of the

[Tr., p. 10, L.

call out,

t0 the

Valley County Store in Jerome City, State 0f Idaho for a

7-25; Tr., p. 11,

L

1-13].

While he could not remember the exact

Ofﬁcer Vekir Alajbegovic remembered

not believed to be alcohol related, but drug related.

that the call indicated that

[Tr., p. 11, L.

it

was

18-25; Tr., p. 12, L. 1-5].

He

did not speak With anyone but was given a description of the vehicle and place but could not

remember Whether a

description of the individual

arrived With ofﬁcer Clark,

described vehicle.

Who was

N0

18].

Ofﬁcer Alajbegovic had a body cam.

this

camera 0n

19].

N0

[Tr., p. 13, L.

When he

parked some distance from the

dash cameras were being operated.

he activated his emergency

memorialization by

given. [Tr., p. 12, L. 7-25].

in another vehicle, they

[Tr., p. 13, L. 1-7].

until after

was

22-25; Tr., p. 14, L.

[Tr., p. 13, L.

1],

17-

but did not turn

lights t0 stop the vehicle. [Tr., p.50, L. 11-

way 0f camera footage was conducted by the Ofﬁcers from the

time

they arrived at the Valley County Store until Ofﬁcer Vekir Alajbegovic initiated the trafﬁc stop.
[Tr., p. 52,

L

6-15]

Ofﬁcer Vekir Alajbegovic described What he saw as the Defendant-Appellant approached
his vehicle [Tr., p. 18, L. 2-25].

carrying, or

He

could not remember what the Defendant-Appellant was

What the Defendant-Appellant dropped. He described seeing the “kind of fumbling

around, and he was just acting odd and spastic.”

[Tr., p. 18, L.

4-25; Tr., p. 19,

L

1-91].

Ofﬁcer

Vekir Alajbegovic described the Defendant-Appellant dropping items, stopping and picking up
items, dropping other items,

number of times

[Tr., p.

Appellant’s Brief Page
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and repeating the same movements, but doesn’t remember the

Ofﬁcer Vekir Alajbegovic indicated
any

illegal activity. [Tr., p. 26, L. 4-10.]

Defendant-Appellant.

He

[Tr., p. 26, L. 11-17].

approximately ﬁve minutes, maybe

that the Defendant—Appellant

was not engaged

could not see the face or complexion of the

He

sat

and watched the Defendant-Appellant for

ten. [Tr. p. 26, L. 8-24].

Ofﬁcer Vekir Alajbegovic did not approach the Defendant-Appellant
under the inﬂuence.

in

[Tr., p. 27, L. 6-19].

In fact, Ofﬁcer Vekir Alajbegovic,

t0 see if he

knowing

was

that the

Defendant-Appellant was going t0 get into a vehicle and drive away, testiﬁed as follows

[Tr., p.

27, L. 15-25; Tr., p. 28, L. 1-11]:

A.
Q.

The behavior could have matched
But you didn’t g0 over

t0

make an

it,

yes.

inquiry 0f that individual

if,

indeed, he

was

under the inﬂuence; correct?

N0,

sir.

So What you saw, though, and knowing that he was going to get into that
you concern that he may be getting into that vehicle
while under the inﬂuence 0f any alcohol, drugs, 0r other intoxicating substances,
particular vehicle didn’t give

did

it?

At the time, sir, I was still trying t0 ﬁgure out if this was a medical issue that
was going on with your client 0r a possible drug investigation that I needed
to —
But you could have done that by making contact with
his car and drove away; correct?

that individual before

he got

understand that, but him getting in and out 0f the car several times, I didn’t
know When he was going t0 leave. I didn’t know What he was going t0 d0, so I
sat there and observed him.

I
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Ofﬁcer Vekir Alajbegovic testiﬁed the reason he did not go over and confront the
Defendant-Appellant,

Who had been there

for

ﬁve minutes was

investigation”. [Tr., p. 29, L. 25; Tr., p. 30, L. 1-7].

Ofﬁcer Clark. He did not

at

He

that, “I

was

still

under

did not at any time communicate With

any time communicate with Ofﬁcer Clark.

[Tr., p. 30, L. 8-1 1].

Ofﬁcer Vekir Alajbegovic then described the Defendant-Appellant driving
the Valley

33, L. 3-1

10].

County Store parking

1].

He was

his car out 0f

signaling properly, and turning North onto Lincoln. [Tr., p.

the only vehicle directly behind the Defendant-Appellant. [Tr., p. 33, L. 4-

Ofﬁcer Vekir Alajbegovic described

driving action

14].

lot,

my

was an

illegal operation

my client as making a “choppy” turn, but nothing in his

0f a motor vehicle

Ofﬁcer Vekir Alajbegovic then testiﬁed

turned into the next lane.

[Tr., p. 34, L.

18-25; TL, p. 35, L. 1—

that the Defendant-Appellant properly signaled

and

[Tr., p. 35, L. 15-18].

Ofﬁcer Vekir Alajbegovic testiﬁed from

his Probable

Cause Afﬁdavit

that the driving

maneuvers the Defendant-Appellant made While proceeding North onto Lincoln and then turning

West

into his apartment

complex

[Tr.,

p 44, L. 1-23]. Even though Ofﬁcer Vekir Alajbegovic

testiﬁed that nothing the Defendant-Appellant did in his driving behavior 0r pattern

Violation of any trafﬁc code or ordinance, he believed he

Defendant-Appellant.

The
The

State

totality

had reasonable suspicion

was a

t0 stop the

[Tr., p. 45, L. 1-13].

of the Defendant-Appellant’s driving was a city block

[Tr., p. 46, L. 3-14].

even implicitly stipulated that nothing the Defendant-Appellant did was in Violation 0f

the trafﬁc laws. [Tr. p. 47,

Appellant’s Brief Page
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L

9-25; Tr., p. 48, L. 1-8]. Ofﬁcer Vekir Alajbegovic then testiﬁed

that

the

What he saw the Defendant-Appellant d0

norms 0f normal driving behavior.

in his driving pattern

Ofﬁcer Clark were identiﬁed.

17-25; Tr., p. 49 L. 1-27].

[Tr., p. 48, L.

During the suppression hearing, neither the
[Tr., p. 11, L.

and behavior was not outside

initial caller,

nor the person

Who spoke with

25; Tr., p. 12 L. 1-10] and [Tr., p. 90, L. 11-25].

The

Defendant-Appellant obj ected t0 each piece 0f information that the unidentiﬁed persons gave as
hearsay and Without foundation.

[Tr., p. 72, L.

Ofﬁcer Vekir Alajbegovic testiﬁed
Clark, [Tr., p. 17, L. 4-19; Tr., p. 62,

him What was
97, L. 2-8].

L 25;

that

he did not hear What the individual said t0 Ofﬁcer

Tr., p. 63,

said to him. [Tr., p. 86, L. 5-10].

Ofﬁcer Clark testiﬁed he did

19-25; TL, p. 73, L. 18-25; Tr., p. 74, L. 1-2].

L

1-8],

nor did Ofﬁcer Clark radio and

However, even without writing a report

Ofﬁcer Beck What was said

tell

tell

[Tr., p.

t0 him. [Tr., p. 94, L. 9-

20].

The

State attempted

and was ultimately able

t0 refresh the recollection

Alajbegovic from the State’s computer regarding what was relayed t0 them

Defendant-Appellant obj ected to
p.

this

of Ofﬁcer Vekir

initially.

The

information as hearsay and having lack 0f foundation

[Tr.,

56-64, all-inclusive].

II.

1.

Whether the

ISSUES

District Court erred in

0N APPEAL

ﬁnding

that the totality

of the circumstances

justiﬁed the trafﬁc stop 0f the Defendant-Appellant.

2.

who

Whether the

called

Sircomm

District Court erred in considering the testimony

0f unidentiﬁed person(s)

0r spoke with the Ofﬁcers at the scene over the Defendant-Appellant’s

obj ections.
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3.

Whether the

District

Court erred in considering the testimony 0f Ofﬁcer Clark.
III.

STANDARD 0F REVIEW

The standard of review of a suppression motion
motion

t0 suppress is challenged,

substantial evidence, but

found. State

v.

we

we

accept the

trial

is

bifurcated.

When a decision on a

court’s ﬁndings 0f fact that are supported

by

freely review the application 0f constitution principle t0 the facts as

Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P. 2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996).

At a

suppression hearing, the power t0 assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conﬂicts,

weigh evidence, and draw

factual inferences

is

vested in the

127 Idaho 102, 106, 897, P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State

v.

trial court.

State

v.

Valdez—Molina,

Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d

659, 662 (Ct. App. 1999).

A warrantless search is presumptively unreasonable unless
and well-delineated exceptions

t0 the warrant requirement.

U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971); State

v.

1999).

it

Coolidge

falls

v.

Within certain special

New Hampshire,

403

Ferreira, 133 Idaho 474, 479, 988 P.2d 700, 705 (Ct. App.

A peace ofﬁcer may make a warrantless arrest when a person has committed a public

offence in the presence 0f the peace ofﬁcer. LC. § 19-603(1). Probable cause

is

the possession 0f

information that would lead a person of ordinary care and prudence t0 believe 0r entertain an

honest and strong presumption that such person

is guilty.

State

v.

Julian, 129 Idaho 133, 136,

922 P.2d 1059, 1062 (1996). In analyzing whether probable cause existed,
determine Whether the facts available t0 the ofﬁcer

at the

moment 0f the

this

Court must

seizure warranted a

person of reasonable caution to believe that the action taken was appropriate.

Id.; State v.

Hobson, 95 Idaho 920, 925, 523, P.2d, 523, 528 (1974). The application of probable cause

Appellant’s Brief Page
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t0

arrest

must allow room

for

some mistakes by

the arresting ofﬁcer; however, the mistakes

may be

those 0f reasonable men, acting facts leading sensibly to their conclusion 0f probability. Klinger

v.

United States, 409 F.2d 299, 304

The

facts

(8th Cir.

1969); Julian, 129 Idaho at 137, 922 P.2d at 1063.

making up a probable cause determination

standpoint. Julian, 129 Idaho at 136-37,

922 P.2d

at

Viewed from an obj ective

are

1062-63. In passing on the question of

probable cause, the expertise and the experience of the ofﬁcer must be taken into account. State

v.

Ramirez, 121 Idaho 319, 323, 824 P2d. 894, 898 (Ct. App. 1991).

A trafﬁc stop by an ofﬁcer constitutes a seizure 0f the vehicle’s occupants and implicated
the Fourth

Amendment’s

prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.

Delaware

v.

Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979); Atkinson, 128 Idaho at 561, 916 P.2d at 1286. Under the

Fourth
there

is

Amendment an ofﬁcer may

stop a vehicle t0 investigate possible criminal behavior if

a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the vehicle

laws. United States

953 P.2d 645, 648

v.

Cortez,

(Ct.

449 U.S. 41

1,

(Ct.

being driven contrary t0 trafﬁc

v.

Flowers, 131 Idaho 205, 208,

417 (1981); State

App. 1998). The reasonableness of the suspicion must be evaluated upon

the totality 0f the circumstances at the time 0f the stop. State

988 P.2d 700, 709

is

v.

Ferreira, 133 Idaho 474, 483,

App. 1999). The reasonable suspicion standard requires

less than

probable cause but more than more speculation or instinct on the part of the ofﬁcer.

Under
t0

the Fourth

be secure in

Amendment 0f the United

their persons, houses, papers,

seizures, shall not

be violated.” U.S.

and

States Constitution, “[t]he right 0f the people

effects, against

CONST. Amend.

IV.

unreasonable searches and

“The Fourth Amendment’s

reasonableness requirement has been held t0 apply t0 brief investigatory detentions.” State

Appellant’s Brief Page
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v.

Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 81

1,

203 P.3d 1203, 1210 (2009)

(1968) (explaining an investigatory seizure
facts

Which justify suspicion

is

(citing Terry

permissible if it

is

Ohio, 392 U.S.

v.

1,

19

based 0n speciﬁc articulable

that the detained person is has been, 0r is about t0

be engaged in

criminal activity). “The quantity and quality 0f information necessary t0 establish reasonable

suspicion

is

less than the necessary to establish

496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990)).

“Still

probable cause.”

Id.

(citingAlabama

“Whether an ofﬁcer possessed reasonable suspicion

the circumstances

known

1210

v.

(citing State

t0 the ofﬁcer at or before the time

v.

Bly,

is

v.

Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1,7

evaluated based 0n the totality 0f

of the stop.”

Id.

At 81 1, 203 O.3d

at

Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983, 88 P.3d 1220, 1223 (Ct. App. 2003)).

Not every suspicious 0r abnormal behavior
See State

White,

reasonable suspicion requires more than a mere hunch or

‘inchoate and unparticularized suspicion.”’ Id. (quoting United States

(1989)).

v.

159 Idaho 708, 71

1,

is

sufﬁcient t0 establish reasonable suspicion.

366 P.3d 193, 196

(Ct.

App. 2016). The ofﬁcer must be

able t0 articulate

more than an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion 0r “hunch” of criminal

activity.” Illinois

v.

Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123-24 (2000) (quoting Terry, supra,

at 27).

An

ofﬁcer conducting an investigatory stop must have a “particularized and obj ective basis for
suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.” United States

41

1,

v.

Cortez,

449 U.S.

417-418 (1981). That determination, the U.S. Supreme Court admonished, “becomes

meaningful only When

it is

assured that at

enforcing the laws can be subj ected to the

some point

the conduct of those charged with

more detached,

neutral scrutiny 0f a judge

Who must

evaluate the reasonableness of a particular search or seizure in light of the particular

circumstances.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 2 1. In undertaking that neutral scrutiny, “the relevant inquiry”
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concerning the inferences and conclusions a court draws

“is

not whether particular conduct

is

“innocent” 0r “guilty,” but the degree 0f suspicion that attaches t0 particular types 0f

noncriminal acts.” Sokolow, 490 U.S.

at 10.

LEGAL ARGUMENT
The

District

Court erred in ﬁnding the

totality

of the circumstances justiﬁed the stop 0f

Defendant-Appellant’s vehicle. The District Court found that the driving conduct and/or pattern

of the Defendant-Appellant’s vehicle by

itself would

not have been sufﬁcient to stop the

Defendant-Appellant.

The Court found

that

Ofﬁcer Vekir Alajbegovic had reasonable,

stop the Defendant-Appellant based

upon

articulable suspicion t0

0f the Defendant-Appellant

his observations

at the

Valley County Store and apparently his driving pattern. The Court speciﬁcally found “that there
is

insufﬁcient evidence to support the trafﬁc stop based solely 0n Defendant-Appellant’s driving

behavior.”

[Memorandum Decision Denying Defendant’s Motion

The

District

t0

Suppress Page

Court also found that Ofﬁcer Vekir Alajbegovic’s legal conclusions about

Defendant-Appellant’s driving pattern were inconsistent.

Defendant’s Motion t0 Suppress Page

9].

The Court

[Memorandum Decision Denying

said that his testimony

“reasons for the stop were based 0n the totality 0f the circumstances.”

Denying Defendant’s Motion
It

t0

must be remembered

Suppress Page

that

lot

was
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clear that his

9].

in Violation

case, then Defendant-Appellant could not, based

Appellant’s Brief Page

was

[Memorandum Decision

Ofﬁcer Vekir Alajbegovic testiﬁed

Defendant—Appellant d0 in the parking

were the

9].

of any law.

that nothing

[Tr., p.

he saw the

26, L. 4-10. If that

upon Ofﬁcer Vekir Alajbegovic’s

observations, have been under the inﬂuence 0f any type 0f intoxicating substances. Ofﬁcer Vekir

Alajbegovic did not

17].

He

make

face-tO-face contact With the Defendant-Appellant. [Tr., p. 26, L. 11-

could not see his face or complexion.

[Tr., p. 26, L. 11-17].

Defendant-Appellant was having a medical condition, or
28, L. 1-4].

Ofﬁcer Vekir Alajbegovic

is

if he

He

did not

was under

know

if the

the inﬂuence. [Tr., p.

familiar With Idaho Statutes prohibiting people to be

intoxicated in public and has arrested people for being intoxicated in public. [Tr., p. 27, L. 1-10].

In fact,

Ofﬁcer Vekir Alajbegovic said the reason he did not make contact With the Defendant-

Appellant

is

that

he was

still

under investigation. Ofﬁcer Vekir Alajbegovic testiﬁed that the

Defendant-Appellant’s driving pattern was not out 0f the
[Tr., p.

norm

for

normal driving behaviors.

48, L. 17-25; T11, p. 49, L. 1-2]. Ofﬁcer Vekir Alajbegovic did not

Ofﬁcer Clark

at all

communicate With

during their entire observation 0f the Defendant—Appellant at the Valley

Country Store, or up

until the

Defendant—Appellant was stopped by Ofﬁcer Vekir Alajbegovic.

[Tr., p. 30, L. 8-1 1].

If the

Defendant-Appellant did not engage in any driving that was inconsistent with

normal driving behavior, or

is

a Violation 0f the trafﬁc laws, then this court should not accept the

District Court’s conclusion that the Defendant-Appellant’s driving

circumstances to stop the Defendant-Appellant.
sees a defendant doing something

To hold

was

part 0f the totality of

otherwise would be to say

odd and suspicious and has the

if

an Ofﬁcer

ability to confront the

person

but doesn’t, just because he gets in a car and drives away, allows the ofﬁcers to stop based upon
a totality 0f the circumstances standard.

Appellant’s Brief Page
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In State

v.

Neal, 159 Idaho 439, 302 P. 3d 5 14 (2015), an ofﬁcer stopped a defendant’s

vehicle at night for driving over the fog line 0n the right and driving in a bicycle lane. Other than

these

two observations, defendant’s driving was completely appropriate. The Court found no

reasonable, articulable suspicion.

The Court 0f Appeals held

give rise t0 a reasonable suspicion 0f intoxication the test

is

that while “a driving pattern

Whether the driving pattern

may

falls

outside ‘the broad range 0f what can be described as driving behavior.” Id. at 443 362 P. 3rd at

518. State

v.

Emory 119 Idaho

661, 664, 809

P 2d 522, 525 (Ct App

1991). In Emory,

Court 0f Appeals found that an Ofﬁcer’s observation 0f a vehicle’s delay

at

a green

Id.,

the

light, the

closeness 0f defendant’s vehicle t0 other vehicles parked along the street, the time of day (2:40

am. on

a

Sunday morning) and the ofﬁcer’s

slow response

t0 a trafﬁc light

circumstances

test,

may be under the inﬂuence were under

its

own

in analyzing the totality

facts,

might take on greater importance
If the driving pattern

in another.”

Emory

else

,

i.e.,

Id. at

may be

how

the Defendant-Appellant’s actions in the parking

Country

Store.

It

was only
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when he

after the

test,

Id. at

663.

“Each case must

insigniﬁcant in one setting

can

it

at bar,

was insufﬁcient

for

be piggybacked onto something

lot, t0

justify a “totality

circumstances” conclusion. Ofﬁcer Vekir Alajbegovic did not immediately
stop the Defendant—Appellant

a

663.

0f the Defendant—Appellant, in the case

an Ofﬁcer to stop the Defendant-Appellant’s vehicle,

Emory

0f the circumstances

because circumstances Which

who have

a totality 0f the

not sufﬁcient for an Ofﬁcer to stop Emory’s vehicle.

The Emory court held
be determined on

training that forty percent 0f all people

tum

0f the

his lights

on

got into his car and drove t0 the exit of the Valley

Defendant-Appellant’s vehicle drove and

made

several

to

maneuvers did the ofﬁcer stop the Defendant-Appellant’s vehicle. In State
(Idaho 2019), 450 P3rd 3

1

5,

the Court found that the

suspicion to seize Gonzales at a vehicle he

Ofﬁcer Scholten,

He saw

a

woman

at

Gonzales,

Ofﬁcer did not have reasonable,

was crouched down

in,

1:30 am, observed a vehicle parked in a dark area between

exit the vehicle

tried t0

man

ran.

He was

facts:

and walk towards one 0f the businesses. He recognized her

speak With her, she made

(Gonzales) lying

it

known that

down on the

thefts in the area.

she did not want t0 talk t0

caught, detained, and later

his light in

was found

t0

Scholten attempted t0 pat him

have methamphetamines 0n his

person. Gonzales ﬁled a suppression motion challenging the seizure.
the seizure and denied his motion.

him

ﬂoor. Gonzales got out 0f the vehicle and

When Ofﬁcer

Scholten noticed he was nervous and twitching.

down, he

articulable

two businesses.

and continued walking. Scholten approached the car she had exited and While shining
the car, observed a

Jr.,

based on the following

from recent criminal investigations. This person was suspected of ﬁrearm

Ofﬁcer Scholten

v.

The Court of Appeals reversed

The

District

Court upheld

the District Court and the

Idaho Supreme Court granted review.

The Court found
Gonzales.

that the

Ofﬁcer did not have reasonable,

A brief investigating detention is permissible if

which justify suspicion

that the detained person

criminal activity. Terry

v.

Ohio 392 U.S.

is,

it is

articulable suspicion t0 seize

based 0n speciﬁc, articulable

has been, or

is

about t0 be engaged in

1.

The Court, quoting from United States

v.

Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1,7 (1989) stated,

“Still,

reasonable suspicion required more than a mere hunch or inchoate and unparticularized
suspicion.”
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facts

It is

also well established that not every suspicious or

establish reasonable suspicion (see State

v.

abnormal behavior

Bly, 159 Idaho 708, 71

1,

is

sufﬁcient to

366 P3d 193, 196

(Ct.

App.

20 1 6)).
Ofﬁcer Vekir Alajbegovic testiﬁed

In the case at bar,

that the Defendant-Appellant

not engaged in any criminal conduct while in the parking 0f the Valley Country Store.
L. 4-10].

did not

Being under the inﬂuence

make

in public is a crime. Idaho

Code §37-2732 C

contact With the Defendant-Appellant, John Allen Loewe.

He

speech, 100k at his pupils, 0r see his complexion. Ofﬁcer Vekir Alajbegovic

Defendant-Appellant to determine

under the inﬂuence.

if what

[Tr., p. 26, L.1-4]. If

(a).

was

[Tr., p. 26,

The ofﬁcer

did not hear his

was observing

the

he was seeing was a medical condition 0r someone

Ofﬁcer Vekir Alajbegovic could not ascertain

Defendant-Appellant was suffering from a medical condition, 0r something

else,

if the

he could not

then determine and assert a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the Defendant—Appellant was

under the inﬂuence. The Defendant-Appellant’s actions did not change.

N0 new information was

provided to Ofﬁcer Vekir Alajbegovic. Ofﬁcer Vekir Alajbegovic did not have any speciﬁc
training in drug detection, except for his ﬁeld sobriety training. [Tr. p. 54, L. 2-8].

If the Defendant-Appellant

was not committing a crime 0f being under the inﬂuence

in

public, the ofﬁcer cannot then say that the Defendant-Appellant’s actions “is, has been, 0r about

t0

be engaged in criminal

activity.” Terry Id, for

he, the Defendant-Appellant,

was not under

purposes 0f reasonable, articulable suspicion. If

the inﬂuence in public, he certainly could not have

been stopped just because he got in an automobile and drove

off. If the

Defendant-Appellant was

not engaged in any criminal activity, his odd, unusual behavior in the parking lot of the Valley
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County Store was insufﬁcient

t0 justify the stop

because even though the actions 0f the

Defendant-Appellant “could” be those 0f someone under the inﬂuence, Ofﬁcer Vekir
Alajbegovic had already testiﬁed that the Defendant-Appellant had not engaged in any criminal

conduct and he did not

The

know

if the

Defendant—Appellant’s behavior was medical 0r otherwise.

actions could have been those 0f someone with a signiﬁcant medical condition.

Without having contact With the individual,

i.e.,

speaking With him, seeing him in a face-to-face,

performing an evaluation, seeing his eyes and hearing his speech, the Defendant-Appellant
asserts the ofﬁcer

United States

The

v.

was simply

acting

Sokolow 490 U.S.

District

0n a hunch, 0r “inchoate unparticularized suspicion.”

1,7 (1989).

Court also erred in considering the evidence offered by the caller in

evaluating the totality 0f the circumstances and the information given t0 Ofﬁcer Clark. Ofﬁcer

Vekir Alajbegovic testiﬁed that Sircomm dispatched him t0 the Valley Country Store.
identiﬁcation of the caller

was

given, 0r that person’s association with

Country Store, or any foundation as
inﬂuence 0f drugs.

[Tr., p. 12,

between Ofﬁcer Clerk and

person

Store.

initial call as

this individual.
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Valley

knowledge 0f someone being under the

was

the only

Ofﬁcer who spoke with any

[Tr., p. 17, L. 11-23].

obj ected t0 the information elicited

both hearsay and having a lack 0f foundation; as well

information provided to Ofﬁcer Clark.

at the

Ofﬁcer Vekir Alajbegovic did not hear any conversations

The Defendant-Appellant continually
regarding the

‘s

L.1-16]. Ofﬁcer Clark

County

individual at the Valley

t0 the

employment

N0

by

the State

as, the

The

District

Court incorrectly assumed that the

initial caller

was

the

same person Who

spoke With Ofﬁcer Clark. [Memorandum Decision Denying Defendant’s Motion

Page

8].

There was no testimony that the

initial caller

Who was

t0

Suppress

unidentiﬁed was the person

Who

spoke with Ofﬁcer Clark.

The

initial caller

was not identiﬁed by

employed by the Valley Country
ascertained. State

v.

Store.

the dispatcher

at,

present, 0r

That person’s identity could not be reasonably

Larsen 135 Idaho 99, 15 P 3d 334 (Ct

the initial caller, 0r the person

by name or being

Who spoke

App

2000). There

was n0 testimony

with Ofﬁcer Clark, had knowledge in drug impairment

detection.

The

Who

District

Court also erred in considering the testimony of Ofﬁcer Clark. The person

spoke with Ofﬁcer Clark

Alajbegovic, nor
Alajbegovic.

As

was

at the

Valley County Store was not identiﬁed by Ofﬁcer Vekir

the information given to

Ofﬁcer Clark relayed

such, the testimony 0f Ofﬁcer Clark

was

to

irrelevant t0

Ofﬁcer Vekir
Whether

01'

not Ofﬁcer

Vekir Alajbegovic had reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop the Defendant—Appellant. This
information should not have been considered by the court regarding the totality of the

circumstances

test.

IV.

Based upon the

totality

CONCLUSION

of the circumstances

test to

determine

if there

articulable suspicion t0 believe that the Defendant-Appellant was, has been, 0r

engaged

in criminal activity, the District

was reasonable,
was about

t0

be

Court erred in ﬁnding that Ofﬁcer Vekir Alajbegovic had

the legal right t0 stop the Defendant-Appellant for the reasons stated above. Secondly, this Court
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should ﬁnd that the information considered by the Court from the
relayed t0 Ofﬁcer Clark,

Loewe, respectfully asks

was improperly
this

Lowe

and the information

The Defendant-Appellant, John Allen

Court to overrule the District Court’s denial of Defendant-

Appellant’s Motion to Suppress and

Mr.

relied upon.

initial caller,

ﬁnd

that all evidence seized or obtained

by

the

Ofﬁcer from

should be suppressed.

DATED this 21“ day 0f July 2020,
By /s/ Rockne K. Lammers
Rockne K. Lammers [ISB No. 3026]
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
121

3rd

Avenue East

Jerome, Idaho 83338

muleman@cableone.net
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ecf@ag.idaho.g0v

/s/
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Rockne K. Lammers
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